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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
John Patrick Linze entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Mr. Linze asserts that his detention was unlawfully extended to allow additional time for 
a drug detection dog, "Hash," to arrive. Mr. Linze also asserts that the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officers at the time they searched the vehicle did not yield 
probable cause because the drug dog "Hash" admittedly is unreliable. Thus, the State 
failed to show a valid justification for the warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle 
in which Mr. Linze was riding. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On November 25, 2013, at approximately 11 o'clock in the morning, a vehicle in 
which Mr. Linze was a passenger was pulled over by law enforcement for an equipment 
violation. (4/28/14 Tr., p.3, L.1 - p.4, L.25.) Specifically, the officer claimed to have 
seen a crack in the windshield which could have obscured the vision of the driver. 
(4/28/14 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.6, L.14.) Nine minutes into the stop, the officer learned from 
other officers that Mr. Linze was a known drug user and, based on this information, he 
called a drug detection dog to the scene; it arrived approximately another ten minutes 
later.1 (4/28/14 Tr., p.7, L.18 - p.8, L.2, p.16, L.3 - p.18, L.7, p.; Defense Exhibit A) 
1 Although Officer Bridges created "two short audio recordings," no portion of any audio 
recording documenting the interaction between Officer Bridges and Mr. and Mrs. Linze 
was admitted at the hearing on Mr. Linze's motion to suppress. (R., p.28; 4/28/14 Tr.) 
Deputy Moore did not have any audio or video recordings relating to the incident. 
(R., p.30.) 
1 
While the vehicle was stopped, it took the officer over 20 minutes to run the driver's and 
Mr. Linze's information through dispatch and write the citation. (4/28/14 Tr., p.7, L.2 -
p.9, L.2, p.10, Ls.6-8.) When the dog was run around the exterior of the vehicle, it 
alerted. (4/28/14 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-25.) After a search of the interior of the vehicle, a pipe 
containing methamphetamine residue was located. (4/28/14 Tr., p.32, L.3 - p.33, L.8.) 
A search of Mr. Linze's person revealed a pair of brass knuckles. (R., p.5.) 
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. Linze 
committed the crime of possession of methamphetamine.2 (R., pp.14-15.) Thereafter, 
Mr. Linze filed a Motion to Suppress, a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress 
Evidence and two affidavits in support of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.21-26, 32-38, 
45-48, 55-65.) He asserted that the evidence gathered against him should be 
suppressed for three reasons: First, his initial warrantless detention was not justified by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion; second, his detention was unlawful; and third, the 
dog's alert was insufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle. 
(R., pp.21-26.) The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Linze's motion to 
suppress and a hearing was held on Mr. Linze's motion. (R., pp.49-54; Tr. 4/28/14.) 
The district court made the following factual findings: 
1. On November 25, 2013, at approximately 10:19 a.m., Officer Bridges 
conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle in Caldwell, Idaho. 
2. Officer Bridges testified that he initiated the stop based on his 
observation that the vehicle had a "spider-web" cracked front 
windshield in violation of I.C. S 49-902. 
2 Mr. Linze was also charged with two misdemeanors-possession of drug 
paraphernalia and carrying a concealed weapon-in a companion case, Canyon County 
case number 2013-26810. (R., pp.5, 9.) 
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3. Officer Bridges made contact with the driver, Rhea Linze and 
explained the reason for the stop. John Patrick Linze, Jr., was a 
passenger in the vehicle. 
4. Officer Bridges then ran both the driver's and passenger's information 
and checked whether either had any outstanding warrants. 
5. During this process, Officer Bridges obtained information from other 
officers that Mr. Linze had an extensive drug history and had recently 
been stopped by other officers who found drug items on him. 
6. Officer Bridges then called for a drug detection dog at 10:28 a.m., to 
conduct an exterior sweep of the vehicle. 
7. \/Vhile he waited for the canine to arrive, Officer Bridges continued 
conducting the warrant checks for Mr. and Mrs. Linze and wrote 
Mrs. Linze a citation for driving with a cracked windshield. 
8. Officer Bridges testified that he did not purposefully delay the process 
to allow the canine unit time to arrive. 
9. Deputy Moore and the drug detection dog arrived ten minutes later, at 
10:38 a.m. 
10. Deputy Moore spoke to Officer Bridges for a few seconds and then 
approached the driver of the vehicle and asked for consent to search 
the interior of the vehicle, which was denied. 
11. Deputy Moore ran the drug detection dog around the exterior of the 
vehicle. 
12. The drug detection dog alerted on the exterior of the vehicle and a 
search of the interior of the vehicle by the two officers revealed a pipe 
which contained methamphetamine residue. 
(R., pp.69-70.)3 In addition to these specific findings of fact articulated by the district 
court, the court also found that Deputy Moore had over ten years experience as a 
canine handler and that Deputy Moore testified that he had no issues or concerns that 
Hash was not functioning as trained. (R., pp.75-76.) The district court ultimately denied 
3 These findings have been presented as individually numbered findings herein for ease 
of reading. 
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Mr. Linze's motion to suppress finding that the initial stop was lawful, the length of the 
investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended, and the canine alert gave the 
officers probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle. (R., pp.68-77.) 
Mr. Linze entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the 
denial of the motion to suppress. (R, pp.78-91.) On July 1, 2014, the district court 
sentenced him to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, but the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Linze on probation for four years. (R., pp.102-
105.) On July 16, 2014, Mr. Linze filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's 
Judgment and Commitment and Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of 
Judgment. (R., pp.106-109, 119-123.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Linze's motion to suppress? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Linze's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The district court reached three legal conclusions. First, the court found that 
Officer Bridges had a reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Second, 
the district court found that the duration on the stop was not illegally extended. Finally, 
the district court found that the canine alert gave the officers probable cause to search 
the interior of the vehicle without a warrant. 
Mr. Linze asserts that, even if his initial detention was lawful, the length of his 
detention was impermissibly extended solely to allow a drug dog to sniff the exterior of 
his vehicle, based upon Officer Bridges' suspicion that there were drugs in the vehicle. 
Officer Bridges detained Mr. Linze until a drug dog arrived and alerted on the vehicle. 
Despite the dog's alert on the exterior of the vehicle, the officers lacked probable cause 
to search the interior of the vehicle as the drug detection dog was unreliable. 
Mr. Linze's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution4 was violated. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. Linze's 
motion to suppress. 
4 The attorney who presented and argued Mr. Linze's suppression motion made a 
general argument under both Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment, but did not assert that the Idaho Constitution provides different or 
increased protection. (R., pp.34-35.) Therefore, Mr. Linze will rely upon Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal. 
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B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appeilate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a 
few narrowly draw exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 
(1971 ). One such exception is the so-called ''automobile exception" wherein officers 
may search a vehicle, or the contents thereof, if probable cause exists to believe that 
the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). The probable cause 
necessary to justify a search of an automobile is the same probable cause that is 
necessary to convince a magistrate to issue a search warrant, that is: facts available to 
the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the 
belief that area or items to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983). 
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for 
a brief, investigatory detention if the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. 
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United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 ·1 (1981) (citations omitted). "The predicate 
permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement 
interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect." Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, 
the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. 
(citations omitted). "It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to 
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Id. 
C. The Duration Of The Traffic Stor Was Unlawfully Extended While Officer Brid ;:ie~ 
Waited For The Drug Detection Dog To Arrive 
Mr. Linze concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful, however, he asserts 
that the stop was unlawfully extended to allow for the drug detection dog to arrive.5 
Officer Bridges took over 20 minutes to obtain the information from the driver and verify 
the driver's and Mr. Linze's information and status. Officer Bridges unlawfully delayed 
completing the initial purpose of the stop to allow the drug detection dog to arrive. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that Officer Bridges still had not completed the writing of 
one, simple traffic citation for an equipment violation when the dog arrived ten minutes 
after it was requested. (4/28/14 Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.2.) Officer Bridges testimony that 
5 While Mr. Linze initially challenged the lawfulness of the traffic stop below, contending 
that the officer could not have seen the crack in the windshield from 30 feet away, in 
light of Idaho case law relied on by the district court, State v. Kinzer, 141 Idaho 557 
(Ct. App. 2005), Mr. Linze concedes that the operation of a vehicle with a cracked 
windshield can provide reasonable and articulable suspicion for a traffic stop. 
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he "takes his time" when he writes tickets because his "handwriting is sloppy" is 
disingenuous, at best, and fails to controvert Mr. Linze's contention that Officer Bridges 
was intentionally delaying to allow the drug detection dog ample time to arrive. (4/28/14 
Tr., p.8, Ls.3-21.) 
Officer Bridges testified that he had never personally met Mr. Linze, but while he 
was in the process of calling in Mr. Linze's information to dispatch, other officers told 
Officer Bridges that Mr. Linze was a known user of drugs. (Tr. 4/28/14 p.15, L.25 -
p.18, L.7.) 
Officer Bridges testified to the following: 
Q. So approximately 20 minutes from the initiation of the traffic stop to 
the time when the canine arrives? 
A Yes. 
Q. What were you doing for 20 minutes? 
A. Like I said, I was conducting all the DMV checks and warrants 
checks of both occupants, and I was writing my citation. 
Q. Why does that take 20 minutes? 
A I was thorough. On my warrants checks I ran both through the 
computer. And my handwriting is very sloppy, so I take my time when I 
write tickets. 
Q. Were you purposely delaying that process to wait for the canine to 
arrive? 
A. No. If I would have finished early, I would have called off the 
canine. 
(Tr. 4/28/14 p.8, Ls.3-18.) Further, Officer Bridges had not finished writing the citation 
when the drug detection dog arrived: 
Q. When the canine officer arrived, do you recall what step you were 
in your process to issuing that citation? 
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A. I was - I was almost finished writing my citation when he arrived, 
and I stepped out to talk to him. 
(Tr. 4/28/14 p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.2.) 
Q. Ultimately did you finish up issuing that citation? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And when was that process completed? 
A. After the search of the car was completed, I went back and finished 
the rest of my citation and issued it to the driver. 
(Tr. 4/28/14 p.10, Ls.2-8.) 
Mr. Linze chailenges the district court's factual finding that Officer Bridges did not 
unreasonably delay the stop in order to allow sufficient time for the drug dog to arrive. 
Officer Bridges took over 20 minutes to check the status of Mr. and Mrs. Linze and to 
write one citation for an equipment violation. The citation is a simple, standard fill-in-
the-blank form, one that requires only basic information such as the location, the 
defendant's information and the perceived violation. (Idaho Uniform Citation,6 attached 
to the Motion to Augment filed on February 20, 2015.) It is not possible to reconcile the 
length of time it took to prepare this one citation with the content of the citation itself. 
Thus the district court's finding that there was no evidence that Officer Bridges 
intentionally delayed the defendant or extended the duration of the stop was 
unreasonable. 
The district court was incorrect in finding that Officer Bridges did not unlawfully 
extend the stop under the guise of allowing writing Ms. Linze a citation for the cracked 
6 The district court took judicial notice of the citation issued to Mrs. Linze in CR-2013-
26802. (R., p.72.) 
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windshield. Officer Bridges took Mr. and Ms. Linze's information and, upon hearing 
from other officers that Mr. Linze had previously been found in possession of drugs, he 
then developed a hunch that Mr. Linze possessed drugs in the car. Thereafter, ten 
minutes into the routine status checks, he called a drug dog and detained Mr. Linze until 
the drug dog arrived. Mr. Linze's detention did not become lawful merely because the 
officer improperly used the 10 minutes to slowly write a citation to Mrs. Linze. 
D. The Alert Of An Unreliable Dog Was Insufficient To Establish Probable Cause To 
Search The Vehicle 
Mr. Linze challenges the district court's factual finding that the testimony of 
Deputy Moore demonstrated that Hash provided a reliable alert in this case. Deputy 
Moore testified generaliy as to why a dog might alert but humans might not locate any 
drugs during a search, but he never testified that in his opinion, his dog was alerting on 
a lingering odor on the numerous occasions that Hash alerted and no substance was 
found. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Deputy Moore was of the opinion 
that the false positives were due to residue and thus his dog was always accurate was 
unreasonable. It is not possible to reconcile the testimony of Deputy Moore with the 
district court's finding of fact because the officer never testified that he believed the dog 
was always accurate. Thus Deputy Moore's testimony cannot constitute substantial 
competent evidence to support the district court's finding that the officer vouched for the 
reliability of the dog and the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. 
Police use of a "well-trained narcotics-detection dog" during a lawful traffic stop is 
valid and generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). A drug dog's alert, in and of itself, can provide probable 
11 
cause to support a search if the State can establish the drug dog's reliability. United 
States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that probable cause 
existed based in part upon the fact that the drug detection dog had never given a false 
alert or failed to detect the drug he was asked to find); see also State v. Howard, 135 
Idaho 727, 731 (2001) (holding insufficient foundation laid regarding drug dog's training 
and reliability precluded the dog's alert from being afforded conclusive weight); State v. 
Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175 (Ct App. 2000) (admission of testimony regarding drug 
dog's indication requires foundation showing the dog's training and reliability); State v. 
Yeoumans, Ill, 144 Idaho 871, 875 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that dog which admittedly 
alerted on residual scent of drugs that were no longer present "is but one factor bearing 
upon the dog's reliability" and affirming the denial of the suppression motion because it 
found ample evidence that the drug dog was well-trained and certified). 
In Braendle, the defense argued "that the State did not present sufficient 
evidence of the drug dog's reliability to satisfy foundational requirements for admission 
of evidence of the dog's behavior in alerting on Braendle's truck." Braendle, 134 Idaho 
at 175. In Braendle, the State presented the testimony of drug dog Clancy's handler 
who testified about their training and experience and "testified that in previous controlled 
testing and training, the dog alerted only on containers that held illegal drugs." Id. at 
175. Clancy's accuracy was challenged because the dog had alerted on school lockers 
where no drugs had been found. Id. 134 Idaho at 175-176. The detective testified that 
he believed Clancy had detected residual odors based upon his history of never giving 
false positives in controlled settings. Id. 134 Idaho at 176. After acknowledging that a 
district court's decision as to whether an accurate foundation has been laid for the 
12 
admission of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, the Court of 
Appeals ruled, "although there was conflicting evidence, in iight of the testimony given 
by the detective, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a 
sufficient foundation had been established." Id. (citations omitted.) 
"Probable cause for a search is a flexible, common-sense standard-a practical, 
non-technical probability that incriminating evidence is present[.]" State v. Wigginton, 
142 Idaho 180, 182-83 (2005). If the State does not establish the reliability of its drug 
dog, any alleged "alert" of such a dog can, at most, be considered as one a factor in the 
"totality of the circumstances" analysis for determining probable cause. United States v. 
Barajas, 216 F.3d 1084, 2000 WL 390664, *2 (9 th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); 
Howard, 135 Idaho at 731. For example, in Howard the Idaho Supreme Court was only 
able to find probable cause because the dog's "alert," which the State had not 
established to be reliable, was accompanied by an already-corroborated informant's tip 
and the confession of a co-defendant. Howard, 135 Idaho at 731. Likewise, in 
Martinez, the Idaho Court of Appeals was only able to find probable cause because the 
dog's unreliable "alert" came after other extremely suspicious clues, namely, that the 
defendant: (a) had lied about his criminal record; (b) had lied about his birthplace; (c) 
had lied about trips across the U.S./Mexican border; (d) had been evasive about his 
connections to Mexico; (e) was suspected of having recently escaped from a work 
release program; and (f) had a backseat stuffed with objects, all of which were covered 
with blankets. State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 428 (Ct. App. 1996). 
In Lingenfelter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that probable cause 
existed based, in part, upon the fact that, "Carlos [the drug dog] and Officer Fleet have 
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participated in approximately 300 hours of training searches, and that Carlos has never 
given a false alert or failed to detect the drug and narcotic training aids that Carlos was 
asked to find. In all, Carlos performed approximately 500 investigations and has been 
successfully relied upon in the past to sniff out narcotics." Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d at 639 
(emphasis added). Thus, Carlos was not only a well-trained drug dog, he had never 
given a false alert or failed to detect the drug he was asked to find. 
In Idaho, it is well settled that, when a reliable drug detection dog indicates that a 
lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has 
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it 
without a warrant. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999); State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 281, n.2 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting that defendant stipulated that the drug 
detection dog was certified for drug searches and had an excellent accuracy record). 7 
Mr. Linze challenged Hash's reliability based on three prior occasions in which 
Hash alerted, but no drugs were found. (R., p.76.) The district court based its 
conclusion that the canine alert gave the officers probable cause to search the interior of 
the vehicle without a warrant on Deputy Moore's testimony. (R., p.76.) The district court 
recalled: 
Deputy Moore stated that in his opinion in each of those occasions, 
residual odors of illegal drugs had previously been there, which left a 
lingering odor. Therefore, in Moore's opinion, Hash did not actually give 
any false positives. Instead he detected the odor of drugs, even though 
the drugs were no longer in that location. 
7 In Gibson, however, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized the problems inherent in 
relying on the "infallibility" of drug detection dogs in a lengthy footnote. Gibson, 141 
Idaho at 283, n.3. Although this note is dicta, it acknowledges the multiple problems 
inherent in using such drug detection methods. 
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(R., p.76.) However, this is an inaccurate representation of what Deputy Moore actually 
testified to regarding lingering odor and the dog's accuracy: 
Q. Deputy Moore, as part of your training and experience or some of the 
trainings you've attended, what is - what is your understanding about why 
a dog might alert but humans cannot find anything? 
A. There's a thing that we talk about it's called lingering odor. Basically to 
put it so people understand if you pop a bag of popcorn in your house; the 
popcorn is consumed; it's no longer there, but you can still smell popcorn 
in the house. 
Dogs' olfactory senses are beyond anything that science can replicate 
right now. So for them to smell something that's been there, it's not 
unfathomable. They can do that for sure. 
Q. This is something you've obviously experienced with the dog that was 
used in this traffic stop. Have you had previous dogs? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Is that a similar experience to the other dogs you've had? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As part of your training and experience have you been around other 
officers who handle drug detection canines? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that experience that they have? 
A. Yes. 
(4/28/14 Tr., p.42, L.11 - p.43, L.11.) 
Although the district court found that Deputy Moore vouched for the reliability of 
the dog, such was a clearly erroneous finding, not based upon substantial and 
competent evidence. (R., p.76.) While Deputy Moore was cross-examined regarding 
the dog's false alerts, he did not offer any information to explain the false alerts or 
rehabilitate the dog's accuracy. (4/28/14 Tr., p.38, L.18 - p.42, L.4.) The prosecutor, on 
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re-direct examination, did ask Deputy Moore whether an odor could linger, but did not 
elicit from Deputy Moore an opinion thai all or any of his dog's errors were caused by 
lingering odors. (4/28/14 Tr., p.42, L.11 - p.43, L 11.) Yet the district court found, 
"[a]lthough there was conflicting evidence, based on the testimony given by Deputy 
Moore, this Court finds that sufficient foundation was established to show that the canine 
in this case provided a reliable alert."8 (R., p.76.) 
Mr. Linze asserts that because Hash has a history of "alerting" when no drugs are 
found, Hash is unreliable, therefore, his "alert" in this case was insufficient to provide 
probable cause for officers to believe drugs were in the vehicle to justify the warrantless 
search. While it is well settled that an officer has probable cause to believe that there 
are drugs in the automobile after a reliable drug detection dog indicates that the 
automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, such was not the case in this 
instance. See Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281. In this case, the dog was unreliable. Hash 
had only been out in the field for a few months.9 (4/28/14 Tr., p.26, Ls.22-24, p.33, 
Ls.16-22.) Further, the dog had proven totally inaccurate in 11.5% of its field work. 
(4/28/14 Tr., p.39, Ls.6-9, p.41, L.23 - p.42, L.4.) At the hearing on his motion to 
suppress, Mr. Linze demonstrated that Hash is an unreliable drug detection dog, thus the 
district court erred in finding that sufficient foundation was established to show that the 
canine in this case provided a reliable alert. 
8 In making this unsupported conclusion, the district court used language similar to that 
used by the Court of Appeals in Braendle. 134 Idaho at 176. However, the facts of 
Braendle are distinguishable because the handling officer in Braendle did vouch for the 
dog's accuracy by testifying that it was his opinion that, in instances where the dog 
alerted on a location where no drugs were found, that location had the residual odor of a 
drug that had once been there. Id. Such was not the case here. 
16 
Because the drug detection dog was demonstrated to be unreliable at the hearing 
on Mr. Linze's motion to suppress, the officers lacked probable cause to search the 
Linze vehicle and any evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search must be 
suppressed. 
E. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Linze's Motion To Suppress 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Linze asserts that his continued detention was 
unreasonable and the search of the Linze vehicle and his person was unlawful and, thus, 
violated his Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Mr. Linze asserts that the discovery of the evidence used 
against him was the product of his illegal detention and unlawful search and should have 
been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Linze asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Linze respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment 
and order of probation and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 20th day of February, 2015. 
SALL~Y· J. COOLEY \ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
9 This was Hash's first certification and Deputy Moore testified that he had been certified 
the previous summer. (4/28/14 Tr., p.26, Ls.22-24, p.33, L.16 - p.34, L.3.) 
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